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Abstract. That architecture should in some way serve the public good is an idea that mostly goes unquestioned. The corresponding 
idea that we know who the public is and what its good consists of largely falls apart in the face of even a little probing. This paper 
investigates the concept of the public inherited from the Enlightenment, its fate in recent times, and possibilities for its reinvention. 
The argument then goes on to suggest ways in which architecture can have relatively more or less of the quality of publicness.
Keywords: public good, Habermas, counterpublics, architecture.
The public realm and its decline
Recall the way the Greeks conceived of public and 
private – the private a realm of privation, good only 
for the satisfaction of basic necessity, but not for the ex-
ercise of personal autonomy; Autonomy was achieved 
in the agora – to feel that something may be missing in 
our current experience. In modern, affluent, capitalist 
societies, this Greek conception has been turned on its 
head. As Jurgen Habermas has observed, “With the 
expansion and liberation of (the private) sphere of the 
market, commodity owners gained private autonomy; 
the positive meaning of ‘private’ emerged precisely 
in reference to the concept of free power of control 
over property that functioned in capitalist fashion” 
(Habermas 1989). The private realm is now where the 
greatest autonomy is enjoyed; the public realm is where 
people must suffer compromises to their freedom. In 
affluent societies, it is easy to begin to regard the pub-
lic realm as little more than a place to procure goods 
that one doesn’t yet have the resources to provide at 
home. Thus, restaurants and bowling alleys (as Robert 
Putnam observed in the book Bowling Alone), for ex-
ample, will go the way of drive-in movies and pub-
lic swimming pools once everyone who so desires is 
wealthy enough to hire their own chefs and install 
their own lanes at home. It is tempting to assert that 
the triumph of the private has only occurred by canni-
balizing the public, but what is more likely the case is 
that the private hasn’t so much eaten the public realm 
as it has fattened on its own success while the public 
withered. The unprecedented quantity of consumer 
goods made available in mature capitalistic societies 
has provided virtually unlimited vistas of personal 
autonomy – as long as the credit holds out. This ex-
pansion of the private has led to severely diminished 
expectations of the public.
Adding to this trend of a public realm diminished 
by personal affluence, as Habermas pointed out, is the 
structural change that occurred in developed nations 
in which the very idea (certainly the original mean-
ing) of the public realm is rendered nearly incoher-
ent. “Tendencies pointing to the collapse of the public 
sphere are unmistakable”, he writes “for while its scope 
is expanding impressively, its function has become pro-
gressively insignificant” (Habermas 1989). What began 
in the seventeenth century as an intermediate realm 
between state and pure domesticity amongst an emer-
ging reading, bourgeois social class – a realm capable 
of critical opposition to state authority  – has, in re-
cent times, become progressively less a self-organizing 
place of resistance and more a childlike beneficiary of 
welfare-state solicitations and consumer of capitalistic 
displays calculated, in a process Habermas terms ‘re-
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feudalization’, to generate widespread acquiescence. 
This has occurred because, as it developed, the bour-
geois vision of open participation became progressively 
clouded in the nineteenth century by the unfair reality 
of an underclass apparently unable to penetrate into 
the public realm; a reality that was only overturned 
by radically democratizing the admission standards. 
This necessary move entailed the unfortunate side 
effect that, as it expanded democratically, the public 
lost its potential for critical self-appraisal and critical 
opposition to state authority: “The principle of the pub-
lic sphere, that is, critical publicity, seemed to lose its 
strength in the measure that it expanded as a sphere and 
even undermined the private realm” (Habermas 1989).
Thus, Rem Koolhaas’ assertion concerning the 
demise of public life that “everything has turned into 
shopping: Airports, museums, theme parks, even 
universities, libraries, and churches. Cities themselves 
are morphing into gigantic malls” (Ockman 2002) fits 
Habermas’s diagnosis perfectly. Even if it were possible 
to reclaim a significant public realm, one capable of 
critical resistance to power, neoclassical economics 
would call into question the purpose. According to 
this view, an intensified private realm of leisure and 
consumption is the desired end result, so it seems, 
for which the bourgeois public realm described by 
Habermas was only a way-station. These days, it seems 
entirely reasonable to assert that if people want a public 
good, they can darn well go out, buy themselves one.
This economic interpretation of the good life has 
thoroughly inundated other, more politically engaged, 
conceptions of the good. It has, in particular, hastened 
the demise of the republican concept of democracy 
in favor of the liberal interpretation. In a republican 
democracy, personal initiative and self-improvement 
serve a greater public aim of participatory self-govern-
ment; which is seen as the essential requirement for 
and expression of liberty. This republican conception 
of citizenship has been replaced in capitalist democra-
cies by the procedural, liberal democracy. The liberal 
democracy operates, instead, on the assumption that 
the most important prerequisite for liberty is the right 
to be left alone; the most liberty is therefore secured 
by government that adopts a neutral framework to the 
activities of its constituents and lets each decide for 
himself or herself the ends worth pursuing. “On the 
liberal conception, by contrast (to the republican con-
ception), liberty is not internally but only incidentally 
related to self-government. Where liberty consists in 
the opportunity to pursue my own interests and ends, it 
may or may not coincide with democratic government” 
(Sandel 1996). The liberal conception regards the re-
publican view with suspicion; casting doubt on the idea 
that an engaged electorate can be produced without 
cajoling and coercing people to participate and that 
coercing participation is a peculiar concept of freedom. 
Republicans believe that demanding participation is a 
small price to pay for the good of true self-government.
While the liberal view seems to abet the withering 
of the public realm, more aggressively libertarian con-
ceptions even call into question whether such a thing 
as a ‘public good’ can really exist – echoing Margaret 
Thatcher’s famous assertion that “there is no such thing 
as society: There are individual men and women, and 
there are families”. Public Choice theory disputes the 
validity of the distinction between individuals seek-
ing their own gain, and something called the public 
pursuing a distinctly different set of goods. The public 
will, according to this conception, is not some myster-
ious, transcendent force for doing good in the world. 
It is nothing more than the sum of individual actions, 
and individual actions are primarily motivated by 
self-seeking ends. Therefore, the idea of serving ‘the 
public’ interpretation through architecture is just a 
sentimental fallacy, or else a disguised means of for-
warding architects’ own agendas. Public Choice theory 
justifies the incursion of the private realm of economic 
man into the political by arguing that the attainment 
of something other than sum of individual goods is 
not possible; and that the political realm is incapable, 
therefore, of improving mankind’s lot over and above 
that which can be achieved by the rewards and penal-
ties of the market. “Logically, if economic man max-
imizes self-seeking behavior in the economic realm, he 
also pursues selfish gain in social and political life. But 
where markets are self-correcting, politics is self-infect-
ing” (Kuttner 1996). Politics is self-infecting because it 
only introduces inefficiencies into market mechanisms; 
it cannot correct them. If politics is incapable of doing 
anything but redistributing goods in ultimately self-de-
feating (because skewed and inefficient) ways, then the 
associated public realm that makes politics possible is 
best minimized.
It comes as little surprise, therefore, that as soci-
ety has become more affluent, the public realm would 
begin to melt away. The seeds of this decline can be 
seen from the very beginning: Those who could af-
ford to have always pursued a private conception of 
the good; the existence of the public realm has served 
as a sort of consolation for those without the means 
to create their own worlds. Certainly, the public tele-
vision show “America’s Castles” would support this 
interpretation. This program inundates viewers with 
images of houses that not only provided lavish living 
spaces, but also indoor pools, screening rooms, bowling 
alleys, and the like. The only reason for public bowling 
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alleys, public choice theory would suggest, is not that 
people find something unique out of bowling in pub-
lic, but rather the economic limitations of their situ-
ations. Contemporary trends in housing production 
would tend to concur. For anyone who can, home has 
increasingly become a pleasure palace of private amen-
ities. The public life is an inconvenient but fortunately 
minimally demanding activity made necessary by the 
facts that grocery delivery is hard to come by these 
days and having a dry-cleaning plant at home would 
be noxious. Robert Putnam’s book Bowling Alone has 
verified the dispiriting decline of so many venues of 
informal gathering in the latter years of the twentieth 
century – from civic and fraternal organizations, to 
bridge clubs and even, yes, bowling leagues.
To round out the retreat of the public realm, the 
philosophy of utilitarianism, which maintains a dom-
inance on the public imagination through cost benefit 
analyses and similar explanations of decisions affecting 
large numbers of people, provides an ideal moral justi-
fication of the individualistic consumerist and liberal 
interpretations of the good. Utilitarianism is an out-
look which cherishes, above all, “states of feeling as the 
source of all value in the world” (Hampshire 1978). 
The state of feeling usually identified as most worthy of 
cultivation is happiness. By privileging happiness as the 
ultimate good toward which all moral actions aim, util-
itarianism provides further justification for the liberal 
and economic interpretations. This is so because the 
idea of happiness is virtually unintelligible as a public 
good. Happiness is something ordinarily experienced 
by individuals; group happiness, to have any mean-
ing at all, is only the sum of individuals’ happiness. 
Utilitarian outlooks favor the idea of architecture as 
a good that enables certain experiences that increase 
the overall happiness in the world, and this leads back 
to the conception of architecture as a consumer good 
maximized in a society as free as possible from the 
narrowing, distorting influence of government.
rebuilding the public
The idea that actions and material goods are ulti-
mately justified by their ability to increase the ex-
perience of happiness in the world parallels the hier-
archy observed by Joseph Pine and James Gilmore 
that as capitalism matures and standards of living 
improve, consumption moves from material goods, 
to services, to information, and lastly to experi-
ences (Pine, Gilmore 1999). This observed hierarchy 
provides empirical justification to utilitarian claims 
of the primacy of the experience of happiness, be-
cause this appears to be what people really are seek-
ing in the world. Happiness, or the perception of 
well-being, turns out, after all, to be exactly what 
people ultimately seek, once they have satisfied basic 
bodily needs. Bentham was right all along about the 
fundamentals of pleasure and pain. Michael Benedikt 
argues that architecture, too, has been swept into 
the justification of design actions through appeals 
to experience: “Although rather few architects today 
are interested in perpetuating the classical-historical 
pastiche that Postmodernism first favored, many are 
still interested in the proposition that all buildings … 
ought to provide exciting and memorable encoun-
ters, albeit with trendier shards and curves or lu-
minous twisted volumes crammed with electronic 
paraphernalia. Follow this trend and extend it, and 
ultimately we must arrive at a new general under-
standing of architecture – to wit, architecture as ex-
perience...” (Benedikt 2001). Thus, in the provision 
and consumption of beneficial experiences, the ulti-
mate good that material items, services, and inform-
ation all facilitate is finally satisfied by architecture 
too. These developments lead to the conclusion that, 
incomplete though the justification of architecture 
through the principles of classical economics may be, 
it at least catches the wave of the times in a way that 
its opposition may not.
The cumulative effect of the logic of classical lais-
sez-faire economics, procedural democracy, and sub-
jective philosophies of the good is to discourage the 
exploration for new interpretations of facts and values 
for public benefit. Classical economics instructs that 
nonintervention in market mechanisms is the speediest 
route for people to obtain what it is they want, liberal 
democracy holds that government is incapable of de-
fining the good without coercion, and subjective philo-
sophies of the good intimate that the good can only be 
found by looking inward. At every turn, the idea that 
the good can be sought via public forum in rational 
argument is discouraged or dismissed. Facts are seen as 
value neutral by these conceptions, and values are seen 
as incapable of rational exposition (due to their origin 
in the private realm), and therefore pointless for public 
debate. Indeed, the very idea of public debate becomes 
suspicious as inherently manipulative; “deliberation 
is taken to be mere logrolling, never legitimate con-
sensus-building or problem-solving” (Kuttner 1996).
This sums up some pretty imposing barriers to re-
furbishing the idea of the public good.
The concept of the public inherited from the 
Enlightenment is in bad shape but it is not completely 
done-in. A variety of vital forms of opposition to the 
architecture of consumerism can be found to exist still. 
In the face of the declining fortunes of the concept of 
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the public, these movements often take the form of 
what Michael Warner describes as a ‘counterpublic’. 
Counterpublics “are defined by their tension with a 
larger public. Their participants are marked off from 
persons or citizens in general... A counterpublic, 
against the background of the public sphere, enables a 
horizon of opinion and exchange; its exchanges remain 
distinct from authority and can have a critical relation 
to power...” (Warner 2002). In other words, they func-
tion much like the original bourgeois conception of the 
public described by Habermas – before that conception 
became so inclusive as to lose its critical capabilities. 
The chief difference between counterpublics and bour-
geois publics is that counterpublics do not necessarily 
take responsibility for promoting all-encompassing 
visions of the good. Different rights movements, fur-
nishing prime examples of counterpublics, are born out 
of repression, unlike the bourgeois public which was 
born out of a rising sense of autonomy. The counter-
public opposition movements Warner identifies seek 
to change opinion within the larger public as much 
if not more than they are concerned to pose a critical 
opposition to state authority – the traditional role of 
the bourgeois public. As the concept of the public at 
large is increasingly ground down, these counterpub-
lics offer the best chance for meaningful change. This 
helps to explain why opposition movements continue 
to flourish while the general architectural public is hard 
to identify.
As welcome as this turn of events is, it still leaves 
a hazy outline of what it might mean in practice for 
architecture to contain or exhibit the quality of pub-
licness. To some degree, its public good conforms to 
the negative sense allowed by consumerism and pro-
cedural democracy as a good that protects us from 
built environments that might otherwise inhibit our 
health, safety, welfare and pursuit of happiness. This 
would be noncontroversial by any standard, but it is 
not enough for the argument laid out here to hold be-
cause this form of good ultimately resolves into the 
private. A more robust and positive interpretation 
of architecture as a public good, however, may gain 
strength from an inherent weakness in any economic 
interpretation of the good.
The Achilles’ heel of the mutually justifying doc-
trines of mature consumerism, liberal democracy and 
utilitarianism is the doctrine of diminishing marginal 
returns, a fact of economic life that calls for reconsider-
ation of Benedikt’s diagnosis of architecture as increas-
ingly about experience. With diminishing marginal 
returns, eventually, the value of any given experience 
will diminish just as surely as will the value of more and 
more refrigerators, or more and more information, and 
result in the demand for new, different, and better ex-
periences. Thus, the experience economy is something 
of a shark, endlessly chewing through new experiences 
in search of happiness, requiring constant movement 
to avoid decline. Benedikt opposes the privileging of 
experience as the measure of architecture’s ultimate 
good with the idea of an architecture of reality, one 
that combines the necessary ingredients of presence, 
significance, materiality, and emptiness.
For the purposes of this argument, ‘emptiness’ is 
by far the most intriguing of these four criteria, and 
by it Benedikt means “a building’s lack of didacticism, 
a sort of indifference and generosity that we can’t or 
don’t want to explain” (Architectural Record, 2001, 
November). A building’s emptiness allows room for 
user interpretation. This idea of architecture’s ‘empti-
ness’ may point the way for works of architecture to 
effectively oppose diminishing marginal returns and 
join forces with the opposition hoping for a justification 
for the act of architectural design beyond the reward 
and punishment of the market.
Consider, for example, the space of the Capitol Mall 
in Washington, DC. Given diminishing marginal re-
turns, one would expect that, through use, its value (the 
regard in which it is held and the significance it holds 
to Americans) would diminish over time, just as the 
thrill of a new car or a roller-coaster ride diminishes. 
Having hosted Civil rights marches and Martin Luther 
King Jr.’s stirring oration, the AIDS quilt demonstra-
tion, the million man march, and many other events 
during its history, we would expect it to be regarded 
as partially, if not wholly used up: March somewhere 
more interesting next time. But just the opposite is the 
case. The civil rights marches and AIDS quilts have 
only added to the resonance of the place – the value it 
holds in the minds of many Americans. It has increased 
in meaning and value through use, not decreased. The 
same holds for a myriad of public places: Rockefeller 
Center, The Hollywood Bowl, Golden Gate Park. These 
places’ ‘emptiness’ to expressions of public interpret-
ation keep them young, from an economic point of 
view. Marketplace economics simply hasn’t the tools 
to account for the kind of value that doesn’t wear out, 
become obsolete, depreciate, or become otherwise 
consumed. The sorts of values which cannot be ad-
equately capitalized are called market externalities. 
Architecture, however, can capture and should make 
use of market externalities.
The quality of publicness
Call this particular kind of emptiness that leaves it-
self open to public interpretation the quality of pub-
licness. A building or part of the built environment 
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has publicness to the degree it encourages and allows 
unanticipated interpretations. Publicness in architec-
ture is a quality that facilitates or encourages self-or-
ganized interpretation of the built environment. 
Guides are neither required nor desired. Openness to 
the unanticipated is the only possible defense against 
diminishing marginal returns because, no matter the 
ingenuity of the architect to anticipate possible uses 
and interpretations, eventually the ability to anticipate, 
mold, and channel interpretation will give out. Upon 
achievement of this eventuality, staleness of experi-
ence sets in, thus diminishing its value. Through its 
publicness, however, the built environment stands to 
be continuously reinvigorated.
As a basic value or justification for architecture, 
publicness is a “thick” concept that combines de-
scriptive and normative content. Encouraging a sense 
of public possession of the built environment, however, 
runs counter not only to the societal trends discussed 
above, but also counter to a persistant strand of thought 
in contemporary architecture which encourages con-
trol, mastery, and aesthetic denial, and discourages 
open-endedness. Architecture with real publicness 
would have to be generous enough to facilitate others to 
make up entirely new narratives using the architecture 
as a prop. Prolonging a building’s value then would no 
longer depend on how cleverly misuse is precluded. It 
would depend more on the architect’s ability to nego-
tiate ‘limitless democratic vistas’ (to borrow a phrase 
from Richard Rorty) of public reinterpretation within 
a building or space that is borne, of necessity, out of a 
certain ideology. Though the quality of publicness is 
“understood to be an ongoing space of encounter for 
discourse” (Warner 2002) this cannot be an argument 
for vast, undifferentiated space either. Such places offer 
too little for public possession to depart from. Instead, 
fig. 1. California academy of Sciences
Source: author.
fig. 2. City of arts and Sciences
Source: author.
the architect’s role in providing for publicness becomes 
the balancing of the definite and the indeterminate, the 
teleological with the openness of ends.
Can we identify features of publicness worth cul-
tivating? And architectural features which discourage 
publicness?
Consider a work of public architecture close to my 
home: the memorial for the Oklahoma City bombing of 
the Murrah building in 1995. Allowing for democratic 
self-organized participation would greatly enhance its 
relevance and longevity. We might have much to say 
for the newer World Trade Center memorial. Though 
an elegant remembrance for those who suffered this 
catatastrophe, there is actually not a lot to DO once one 
takes a tour. The experience will be largely the same 
year in and year out.
Public spaces in and around buildings can be sized 
to encourage or discourage public self-organized activ-
ity. Consider the Academy of Sciences in San Francisco 
by Renzo Piano and the similarly functioning build-
ing in Valencia by Calatrava. In the first the scale and 
sense of enclosure of the forecourt fosters a busy social 
setting whenever the building is open. In the second, 
sculptural buildings in a vast space intimidate all but 
the largest of crowds.
Or consider Sandy Wilson’s British Library which 
invites people to inhabit its forecourts and the similarly 
functioning yet windswept and forbidding Bibliotech 
Nationale.
Governmental buildings, especially, need to convey 
a sense of hierarchy and of human occupation to en-
hance their publicness. Contrast the 1924 San Francisco 
City Hall with the much lauded Federal Building by 
Morphosis Architects just blocks away.
In the first, one can well imagine the seat of au-
thority centrally placed in the rotunda. In the lat-
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ter, all sense of human occupancy seems deliberately 
erased – however exciting may be the form-making. 
This is not necessarily a case of traditional versus 
modern. Even in Rafael Moneo’s Murcia City Hall, a 
sense of hierarchy and human occupation translates 
through the form making.
The actual excitement of the architecture is often 
secondary. Even rather drab buildings, such as the 
Royal Festival Hall in London, can participate in pub-
licness. The self-organizing character extends next 
door at the National Theatre, where public space is used 
to image new dimensions of spatial experience. These 
principles do not only apply to governmental buildings. 
Rowe’s Wharf on Boston’s waterfront, a 1980s develop-
ment designed by Skidmore Owings Merrill provides 
a wonderful example of well-organized yet empty (in 
Michael Benedikt’s sense) space suitable for repeated 
public interpretation.
The possibility of coming together to possess a 
place like the Capitol Mall, if only for a while, makes 
Pragmatist philosopher John Dewey’s vision of an aes-
thetic democracy of highly engaged citizenry palpable. 
The aesthetic democracy can, and should, have an in-
timate connection with public space. In the aesthetic 
democracy, aesthetic value emerges, not through the 
experience of taking in and savoring sensations as the 
connoisseur does, but through active participation. 
Unlike taste, value is a public affair, and also unlike 
taste, is oriented outward – towards putting oneself out 
into the world – rather than inward, of making oneself 
a repository for the most exquisite discriminations. In 
the pragmatist conception of knowledge, one comes to 
know oneself or anything else only through interaction 
with the world. In a sensory deprivation chamber, there 
is no self, or at least one cannot know if there is a self or 
not. Similarly with art. One comes to know of art and 
aesthetic value by the rich and various ways one can 
interact with it, not by how thoroughly one can isolate 
and purify the experience of it. This pragmatic concep-
tion is particularly good news for architecture, which is 
fig. 6. San francisco federal Building
Source: author.
fig. 3. British library
Source: author.
fig. 4. Bibliotech nationale
Source: author.
fig. 5. San francisco City Hall
Source: author.
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the most immersive medium possible, encompassing as 
it does, not just the eyes or ears, but the whole body in a 
huge variety of situations. Out of participation emerges 
meaning and value, and Dewey was right to invoke the 
example of the Greeks in this regard. It hardly seems a 
coincidence that a society that enjoyed the most intense 
public participation also enjoyed intense aesthetic de-
velopment of the built environment. Our isolating and 
savoring of Greek art and architecture can only impart 
a nearly colorless echo of that public world into which 
one could throw oneself in intense participation. Only 
in built environments of real publicness is this possible. 
In these places and spaces, people are encouraged to 
invent how they will participate.
Through a consideration of architecture as funda-
mentally a public good, a more effective defense of the 
value of the architecture profession itself can begin to 
be envisioned as the chief defender of the public good 
of the built environment.
references
Benedikt, M. 2001. Reality and authenticity in the experience 
economy, Architectural Record 2001(November): 84–89.
Habermas, J. 1989. The structural transformation of the public 
sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. First published in 
German in 1962.
Hampshire, S. 1978. Morality and pessimism, in S. Hampshire 
(Ed.). Public and private morality. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
Kuttner, R. 1996. Everything for sale. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Pine, J.; Gilmore, J. 1999. The experience economy: work is theatre 
and every business is a stage. Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press.
Ockman, J. 2002. The YE$ Man, Architecture 2002 (March): 77.
Sandel, M. 1996. Democracy’s discontent: America in search of 
a public policy. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Warner, M. 2002. Publics and counterpublics. New York: Zone 
Books.
tOM sPectOr
School of Architecture, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, 
OK, USA. E-mail: tom.spector@okstate.edu
Tom Spector received his PhD in architecture from the Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley and is now a professor of ar-
chitecture at Oklahoma State University. He is also a licensed 
architect in the United States. In 2011 he became a life fellow at 
Clare Hall, Cambridge University. His prime area of research 
is in architectural ethics. In 2001 he published The Ethical 
Architect: The Dilemma of Contemporary Practice and more 
recently was the co-author of How Architects Write. Spector 
is the managing editor of the new journal Architecture Philo-
sophy. Information about the journal and access to Volume 
One can be found at http://ojs.library.okstate.edu/osu/index.
php/jispa/issue/current
